No trading arm. Retention disclosed.
Architecture and tests you can inspect: the service has no broker, exchange, custody or order path; ordinary raw working payloads are transient; and the paths that do retain state are listed explicitly. These controls reduce capability and exposure without claiming operator misuse is mathematically impossible.
Three walls, not three promises.
Your strategy stays with you
Tests run in memory on data you send; raw inputs, rules and code are not retained. What the ledger keeps is the trial's paper trail: a one-way fingerprint, the verdict with its cause of death, summary statistics, a 32-number sketch of the return profile — family accounting needs it, and it is far too coarse to reconstruct trades or rules — and the family's structural label with its parameter coordinates for the anonymised graveyard. One deliberate exception: a spec you pre-register is stored in full, because sealing a claim means storing it. The complete inventory, path by path: what we keep.
No honeypot
Verdicts are demote-only: we can devalue a signal, never crown one. There is no list of „verified winners" anyone could raid — the graveyard holds only anonymised statistics about failed families.
No trading arm
No exchange connections, execution logic, custody, broker or order path. A release canary exercises the covered logging, error, metric and alert sinks with a marker; that is scoped regression evidence, not a universal proof.
Don't trust an examiner who won't be examined.
Transparency here is not a blog promise — it is a public API. Everything below is live right now; click it.
Calibration v0 state
The endpoint publishes only the bucketed evaluated-mature-registration count, an accumulating status and insufficient_history. It does not yet publish an outcome curve. Valid snapshots expose their signature fields; unavailable signing is explicit.
GET /v1/public/calibrationChained history
Registered signals enter an operator-published hash chain. A retained response or chain head makes later divergence detectable; independent timestamp trust requires a separately controlled external anchor.
PUBLISHED CHAIN COMMITMENTSigned artifacts, public check
Separately issued certificates are Ed25519-signed and tamper-evident: an altered or revoked certificate fails verification. The x402 gauntlet response has a named receipt that is signed when the deployment signing key is available and explicitly unsigned when no signing key is configured. Check certificate fields, not marketing prose.
ALPHAASSAY.COM/VERIFYPublic graveyard digest
Anonymised death statistics of whole strategy families — no individual submissions, ever. Free to pull.
GET /v1/public/graveyard-digestYour agent checks our proofs. You read the result.
Someone showed you a certificate?
Run the hosted platform-trust check in three seconds — valid, invalid or valid-but-revoked. Full offline verification needs an independently pinned root, the signed keyring and complete revocation-head history; a published key alone proves only a raw signature.
A pre-registered evaluation that has to age honestly.
The strongest objection to any validator
is „only live results count." We agree — so mature pre-registrations are counted, while
reliability remains explicitly insufficient_history until an outcome metric exists.
Recorded before evaluation
Pre-register a call and retain its operator-published timestamped commitment. Later divergence is detectable against that retained copy; external anchoring status remains explicit.
Evaluated on what came after
Forward evaluation scores the frozen call strictly on data from after its seal. The verdict meets reality, on the record.
Current public disclosure
Calibration v0 publishes the bucketed evaluated-mature-registration population and an accumulating/insufficient-history state, not hits, misses or a score. A valid snapshot exposes its Ed25519 fields; a stale or unavailable one says signed:false.